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COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS ON READING THE AMENDED YUGOSLAV
CODE: INTERROGATION OF DEFENDANTS IN YUGOSLAV
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
MIRJAN R. DAMASKA*
In America the problem of interrogation as an
aid to law enforcement has been the continuing
focus of intense interest and debate.' Recently,
the same problem was discussed in Yugoslavia in
connection with the 1967 amendments to that
nation's Code of Criminal Procedure. While these
amendments were not limited either to the prob-
lem of interrogation of suspects and defendants,
or to pre-trial procedure, some of the most impor-
tant changes concerned the techniques and cir-
cumstances surrounding interrogations. Certain of
these amendments provide the possibility of a
substantial lessening of the extensive reliance on
interrogations of defendants and suspects which
has been a traditional means of discovery in non-
adversary systems.2 These legislative innovations,
if extended to the limits of their potential, could
render the traditional affaire d deux of custodial
interrogation practically impossible and could
lead to answers about the necessity of interroga-
tion as a tool of law enforcement.'
A rare opportunity thus has arisen for the com-
paratist in America to observe how essentially
identical issues are approached in the divergent
* Associate Dean, University of Zagreb, Yugoslavia;
Visiting Professor of Comparative Law at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 1966-68.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 18 U.S.C.A. §3501 (1968);
Cray, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions: The
Ethical Imperative, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 173; Kamisar,
Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments
on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Volun-
tariness" Test, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 59 (1966); Robinson,
Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating
to Interrogation as Revealed by Pre- and Post- Miranda
Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Com-
ply, 1968 Ducx L.J. 425; Sutherland, Crime and
Confession, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 21 (1965); Developments
in the Law-Confessions, 79 H.uv. L. REv. 935 (1966).
2The non-adversary or inquisitorial system is found
in most Continental countries and consists in the judge
taking an active part in questioning the defendant
both at, before and during the trial.
3 This is not unlike the situation in America, where
decisions like Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436 (1966),
if literally and logicalJy followed, may produce the
same result. See SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AXD SoCIETY
31 (1967).
settings of adversary and non-adversary systems
of criminal proceedings which settings also are
vastly different in their prevalent political and
cultural conditions. Since there are a great number
of variables involved, comparative presentation is
difficult and this article will not consider many of
these distinctions. Rather it only offers the basic
information necessary for a more ambitious com-
parative study of the interrogation problem.
Instead of discussing the Yugoslav legislative
changes on the abstract level of "black-letter
law," here particular emphasis will be placed on
the amendments' potential practical impact. Also,
for a characteristically American approach to
procedure, the opportunities of bypassing the
statutory law by the agencies of criminal proce-
dure4 will be considered. A number of Yugoslav
legal concepts will have to be "domesticated" for
the sake of presentation from this unique angle.
Space limitations prevent an attempt to place the
Yugoslav legislative amendments in a historical
and comparative perspective by relating them to
the very different developments of pre-trial pro-
cedure in other civil law countries.5 But, compara-
4 The term "agencies of criminal procedure" is used
in the text to encompass judicial as well as non-ju-
dicial officials (e.g., police officials) who are in charge
of the criminal process at a particular moment, without
regard to whether or not lawyers classify the procedural
stage in question as criminal proceedings in a technical
sense.
5The Yugoslav development is particularly inter-
esting against the backdrop of procedural thinking in
other socialist countries. The salient feature of criminal
pre-trial proceedings in all socialist countries other than
Yugoslavia, due to the influence of the Soviet procedural
model, is the absence of pre-trial judicial examinations.
Reasons usually advanced for this omission can be
found in Waszczynski's contribution to THE ACCUSED,
A CowPARAnvE STUmy 260-61 (Coutts! ed. 1966).
The first Yugoslav post-war Code of 1948 followed the
Soviet pattern in this as well as many other respects.
Compare, VAsILJEv16, SisTEm KmviNOG PROCESNOG
PRAVA SFRJ (A TREATISE or YuGosLAv CannNAL-
PRocEnuRAL LAw) 43 (1964). The second Yugoslav
Code of 1953 introduced the pre-trial judicial investiga-
tion, but only with respect to more serious offenses. In
prosecutions for minor crimes, investigations were
carried out by specially authorized police officers.
Even in cases involving serious crime the defendant
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live remarks often will be made in footnotes to
avoid the danger of mistaking features of Yugoslav
law, strange to a common law lawyer but quite
normal to a civil law lawyer for peculiar charac-
teristics of the Yugoslav procedural system.
Despite all these limitations, hopefully some
evidence will emerge supporting the proposition
that in the area of procedure there exists a "com-
mon core"8 of problems among various legal sys-
tems, notwithstanding momentous differences in
political, cultural and legal outlook.
POLICE INTERROGATION
In Yugoslavia, as throughout the world, the
investigative activity of the police7 begins when
the authorities become aware of the probability
that a criminal offense has been committed. In
this situation Yugoslav police are compelled to
commence a series of investigative acts' including
such routine police work as collection of physical
evidence. They will also question suspects or other
persons likely to possess information about the
crime. Police investigations are designed to pro-
vide the prosecutor with needed background infor-
could legally be interrogated by non-judicial officers,
and records of interrogations could be used as evidence
at trial. The Code of 1953 was amended several times.
The latest amendments, aspects of which are discussed
in this paper, occurred in 1967. (Official Gazette of
SFRY no. 23, 1967). They gave the whole pre-trial
stage a new look. Under the amended Code, pre-trial
investigation is exclusively in the hands of the investi-
gative branch of the judiciary. Many limitations which
bad been imposed on the right of counsel to effectively
participate in pre-trial proceedings were abrogated. The
role of the police in interrogations will be dealt with
in the text.
6The descriptive label "common core" has been
borrowed from participants in the Cornell Compara-
tive Law Project. See, Sc.EsINGER (ed.), FORMATION
or CONTRACTS (1968).7 The Yugoslav technical term for police is "agencies
of internal affairs." However, because these agencies
functionally correspond to the police and for the sake
of brevity, the term "police" will be used throughout
this article. It must be emphasized, however, that the
term "police" is not officially used in any socialist
country. The origins of this phenomenon probably go
back to the first Russian revolutionary decree on the
Militia (1917), which attempted even on the semantic
level to stress lack of continuity with Tzarist police.8 Compare, art. 140 YuGosLAv CODE Or CRUSNAL
PROcEDURE [hereinafter cited as CCP). More often
than not the police will commence their investigation
on their own initiative. Sometimes, however, a report
of crime will reach the public prosecutor's office first.
In this situation, if the report requires any substantia-
tion, the prosecutor is authorized by law to require the
police to supply him with necessary information for
the decision to press charges. Art. 142 CCP. The police
are duty bound to render the needed assistance to the
prosecutor. Id.
mation to decide whether to set the formal inves-
tigative machinery in motion. 9 The initial police
work precedes the decision of the public prosecutor
to request the investigating judge, who cannot act
of his own motion, to consider instituting judicial
proceedings10 The end of the judicial pretrial
investigation marks the technical beginning of the
criminal proceedings. Consequently, the investi-
gative police activity occurs outside the criminal
proceeding and is in principle not governed by the
rules enunciated in the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure.u
Experience teaches, however, that there is in
many Continental systems a tendency for this
police investigation to furnish much more than the
prescribed background information. This requires
a brief explanation. In the course of the subsequent
judicial investigation (which has no counterpart
in the United States), investigative acts (e.g.,
interrogation of persons) will be repeated by the
investigative branch of the judiciary. Unlike investi-
gations at the police level, these judicial inquiries
will be carried out in compliance with often very
demanding technical rules of criminal procedure.
Hence a strong temptation arises to derive as much
as possible from the interrogation of the suspect at
the earliest stage, before the imposition of legal
restrictions which, to a police officer's mind,
hamper efficient interrogation. Thus appears a
common hypocritical arrangement in which pro-
cedural codes provide a full panoply of safeguards
for the defendant during the pre-trial judicial
investigation, while allowing crucial incriminating
statements to be obtained from the suspect by the
police. Not infrequently, these statements are
obtained under color of law by creating a false
impression in the suspect's mind that an obligation
to cooperate with the police exists. To an extent,
therefore, the subsequent judicial investigation
9 This is the theory even if the police activity has been
triggered, as is usually the case, see note 8 supra,
without any request from the prosecutor. Upon re-
ceiving a signal that a crime has been committed, they
are supposed to check these signals only to the extent
necessary for an enlightened decision to institute ajudicial examination of the matter. See text accom-
panying note 34 infra.10 For an outline of the nature and duties of the
investigating judge see discussion at p. 11 supa.
" In the United States before a formal decision to
prosecute, the dictates of the Constitution as well as
various statutory and court made rules apply to in-
vestigative police activity. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, V,
VI; Davis v. United States, 394 U.S. 721 (1969);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see note 1 supra.
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frequently turns into an empty ritual 2 Much of
the temptation to collect decisive evidence at this
early stage would vanish if the police reports of
their investigative activities (e.g., reports of con-
fessions obtained) are inadmissible as evidence at
trial or if, in addition, these reports are removed
from the dossier of pre-trial procedure which is
studied by the trial judge in advance of the trial."
The amended Yugoslav law, desiring to avoid
this circumvention of procedural safeguards and to
limit initial police work to sources of information
other than the potential defendant, does prohibit
the inclusion of official police reports in the dossier.
The only traces left of police interrogations in the
official police report of crime are lists of persons
who should be interrogated during the judicial
investigation, and the information likely to be
obtained from them.
Another effort to discourage police interrogation
of suspects is made in provisions dealing with
emergency situations and "anticipatory proof-
taking." In view of the ephemeral nature of some
evidence, it must be gathered before the judicial
investigation has been instituted or it will be
irretrievably lost. Faced with this problem, Yugo-
This tendency for the "informal" police inquiry to
assume far greater importance than the "formal"
judicial investigation is best exemplified by the develop-
ments in France following the enactment of the famous
loi Conslans of 1897. See, 2 STFANi/LEvAssEuR,
DROrr PtNAL GWRAL ET PROC DURE PNALE 105,
215 (2 ed. 1966). Under former Yugoslav practice
similar tendencies were noticeable.
13 The "dossier" of a Continental criminal case has
no exact analogue in American criminal procedure, the
nearest approximation being the prosecutor's file.
The "dossier" is kept by the procedural agency which
at that particular stage is conducting the proceedings
(e.g., investigating judge, trial judge, etc.). Each step
in the proceedings (decisions rendered, proof-taking
activities, etc.) has to be reduced to writing and the
resulting document included in the "dossier". The same
is true of all documents filed or otherwise submitted
by the participants in the proceedings. After the
investigative phase is completed, the whole "dossier"
continues to grow, as it passes from the investigators
to the prosecutor, to the trial court, to the appellate
court, etc. Thus the whole history of the case is con-
tained in it.
The "dossier" developed from the acta of the in-
vestigation (inquisitio) in the medieval inquisitorial
procedure. Its importance was then paramount, for
the trial court would base its decision on records of
proof-taking contained in it, rather than on evidence
produced directly before the court. In contemporary
Continental proceedings the importance of the "dos-
sier" is greatly reduced as a result of the so-called
principle of directness, See note 61 infra. Still the "dos-
sier" is very important, and a proper understanding of
how the Continental procedure actually works cannot
be gained without some understanding of it.
slav law makes an exception to the general pro-
hibition against proof-taking by the police and
authorizes them to undertake these activities-if
the investigating judge is not immediately avail-
able--but only in full compliance with procedural
formalities. Protocols of these activities may then
be included in the dossier and, subject to certain
restrictions,14 admitted as evidence at the trial.
But even in these emergency situations under the
amended Yugoslav law the police are never au-
thorized to formally interrogate any person, be he
a potential witness or defendant. The police must
wait for the investigating judge to carry out the
interrogations.
Although persuaded that most inducements to
interrogate suspects are thus reduced, an American
lawyer, projecting his views into the Yugoslav
situation, will still be greatly interested in what
safeguards persons subject to police interviews
have against potential police pressure and abuse."5
And in all fairness it cannot be said that motiva-
tion to obtain incriminating statements from the
suspect is totally absent. For example, although a
confession obtained at the police station is not
admissible at trial, an argument can be made that
the confession to the police makes it psychologi-
cally difficult for the defendant not to confess to
the investigating judge since he has already "let
the cat out of the bag."' 6 Before an attempt is
made to pursue this problem, a general and some-
what delicate comparative observation will be
offered in full awareness of its impressionistic
character. Yet, this observation is needed in order
to put this point into proper perspective and to
compare meaningfully the socio-psychological
pressures and tensions involved in police interro-
gations.
The label "inquisitorial" is attached in common
law countries to European non-adversary proce-
dure, but contrary to what this seems to suggest, it
appears that in the typical American criminal case
there are a number of built-in pressures on the
police to seek confessions that have no counterpart
on the Continent. The first one emanating from the
nature of modern Anglo-Saxon procedure, is that
only at the earliest stage, preceding the initial
1" See note 63 infra.
"In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the
Supreme Court emfihasized that the procedural re-
quirements imposed by its holding were to offset the
coercive effect of custodial interrogations by the law
enforcement authorities.
"6 United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
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appearance before the magistrate, can the poten-
tial defendant be subject to questioning. Subse-
quently, the defendant is only available as an
evidentiary source if he volunteers to take the
stand. In Continental non-adversary proceedings
there is ample opportunity to interrogate the de-
fendant throughout the judicial (or prosecutorial)
pre-trial investigation, as well as at the trial itself.
These multiple opportunities to question the
defendant remove much pressure and tension from
the crucial first encounter of the suspect with
law-enforcement officials.
The second pressure is connected with guilty
pleas, which do not exist on the ContinentY It is
probably true that due to limitations on available
time and financial support the adversary model of
jury trials can properly work in the United States
only if substantial numbers of defendants plead
guilty thereby obviating the need to go to tria' 2
Is it not very likely that those who confess to the
police will more easily be persuaded to plead guilty?
A German observer has a further point in his the-
ory that the numerous American exclusionary rules
of evidence, like the hearsay rules, which do not
exist in Continental countries, remove so much rele-
vant evidence from the trial that the emphasis on
confessions is inherent in the system 19 Finally,
while the jury verdict must, in America, be unani-
mous, Continental fact-finders usually decide by a
majority vote. Is a confession not the kind of evi-
dence most likely to avoid a hung jury? In short, it
would seem that where the European investigator
is primarily interested in getting cues from the
statements of a suspect, his American counterpart
will be eager to get a signed confession that will
stand up in courtO It is obvious that less pressure
is needed to obtain clues than to get confessions.
1"See FED. R. CRn. P. 11; McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).IsIn "1968 approximately 86% (22,055 out of
25,674) of all convictions obtained in United States
District Courts were pursuant to a plea of guilty or
its substantial equivalent...." Id. at 463 n.7. But, it is
noted, "[Ain extorted confession is often the white flag
of surrender which precedes the guilty plea." Note, 53
MNN. L. Rxv. 559, 560 n.12 (1969).19 Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Struc-
ture of Evidence Rules Under the Common Law System
and the Civil Law System of "Free Proof" in the German
Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BurIF.IO L. REV. 132
(1966).
21 Note 28 infra. Throughout this article we assume
that the police force in the countries concerned can be
trusted (or mistrusted) to an equal degree, and that
each is equally vulnerable to pressures stemming from
its desire to do a good job of combatting crime. In
actuality, differences among police forces may be quite
Yet, the fact remains that in the European
setting there still exist pressures, even if reduced,
resulting in aggressive and insistent police interro-
gations. The desire to solve cases puts substantial
pressures on the authorities to elicit information
from the suspect who does not have countervailing
power to resist aggressive police tactics. In this
situation it is dangerous to leave the conduct of
police interrogations entirely to police discretion
even if, as in Yugoslavia, confessions and admis-
sions obtained by the police are not competent
evidence.
What then are the restrictions imposed on the
police in questioning suspects in Yugoslavia?
Needless to say, gross abuse, such as coercion and
methods violative of human dignity are prohibited
and constitute criminal offenses.2 Moreover, police
interviews are by law predicated on the voluntary
cooperation of citizens. A provision in the amended
Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the police
from repeatedly summoning to interviews those
persons who have previously refused to furnish
information.s The law is, however, silent on the
important issue as to whether the interviewed
person would be notified of his legal right to refuse
to answer questions. He can easily get the impres-
sion that there is a duty to answer questions, if
only from the fact that upon failure to appear on
police summons he can be brought to the interview
by force.23
Using as a point of departure the fact that the
investigating judge, as opposed to the police, is
under a duty to warn the defendant of his right to
remain silent, some Yugoslav authorities propose
theories resembling those of people in the United
States who reject the acceptability of having
different standards in the "gatehouse" of criminal
justice, from those in the "mansion." These
Yugoslav authorities assert that the same stand-
ards binding the investigating judge also must, at
least as a matter of professional ethics, apply to
police officials. For the police to conduct inter-
views in a manner which creates the impression
wide in this respect, even if divergent pressures of
criminality and different degrees of restrictiveness of
rules regulating police work are left aside. Note, e.g.,
that the Continental police are (as a comparative
matter) highly centralized, that there is a specialized
subdivision of the force authorized to participate in
crime investigation, and that there are other important
institutional differences.
21 This seems to be the case in most modem legal





that the suspect is under a duty to make state-
ments and to confess if guilty is, in this view, a
flagrant violation of the professional police officers'
ethic." It also must be noted that since interviews
are based on the voluntary cooperation of the
citizen and are not a means to gather competent
evidence, the law does not provide for the suspect's
right to counsel's presence and assistance during
police interviews.
Even though somewhat peripheral to our theme,
it may be useful in evaluating the setting of police
interviews to consider the police activity leading up
to them. The police interrogation of suspects in an
American police station typically follows an arrest.
The latter will often be preceded by limited on-the-
street questioning which in turn follows a police
stop. What is the situation in Yugoslavia? There is
has been little actual experience under the amended
Yugoslav Code, and to review the procedures under
it will require great reliance on guidelines provided
by the legislators. It is obvious that interviews were
contemplated by the drafters to occur mainly in
response to police summons. The summary pro-
cedure will be realistic to an American only in
cases in which the nature of the crime and sur-
rounding circumstances do not call for an arrest
and speedy police action. However, it must be
remembered that arrest plays a somewhat different
role in Continental criminal procedures. Conse-
quently, in many instances in which there would be
an arrest in America, there will be in Yugoslavia
and other European countries only a stop, followed
by the requirement to present an identity card.
The suspect would then be left free with the
expectation of receiving a summons for police
interrogation in the next few days.25
4 See BAYER, ZAKONIX 0 KsuvI6oM POSTUPRU(Code of Criminal Procedure) (commentary to art.
140) 1143 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BAYER, ZAxoNiK].
For a different view in France, see Bouzat La
loyautM dans la recherche des _preuves, in PROBaksxS
coNTEmPoRAINS D PROCfimURE PANALE, RECUEUIL
'ETuDES Ex HOmAGE i M.L. HuGUENEY 166 (1964).
.
5 Differences that exist in the theoretical importance
and need for arrest between American and Continentaljurisdictions are largely unexplored. All that we can
offer here are some tentative suggesti6ns vulnerable to
rebuttal by empirical studies.
Consider, for instance, differences in the law of
arrest. "Probable cause" that a felony has been com-
mitted and that a specific person committed it suffices
for a legal arrest in American jurisdictions. However,
the arrested person is accorded (except in certain
narrow classes of crimes) an absolute and often con-
stitutional right to bail. The Continental legal design
is quite different. The functional equivalent of Ameri-
can "probable cause" is only the basis on which the
specific arrest (and subsequent detention) grounds are
Frequently, of course, an immediate arrest will
have to be made. The amended Code does not
contemplate police interrogation in this situation.
The arrested person must be brought before the
"most easily accessible" investigating judge
"without delay."26 Any delay is justified only on
account of "insurmountable obstacles." In case
the delay, even if justified, extends 24 hours, it
must be explained in writing.21 Any unjustifiable
superimposed. There must, in addition, be a danger
that, if not arrested and detained, the person will
abscond, tamper with evidence, or repeat the offense.
But, when one of these additional grounds is found,
there is in Continental countries no "right to bail" at
all. Release of the arrested person from detention is
never permissible as long as the danger of tampering
with evidence or recidivism persists. An important
difference can also be found in the fact that in America,
probably as a carry-over from old jurisdictional think-
ing, prosecution for grave crimes can traditionally
commence only by an arrest. On the Continent there are
many alternatives. Also Continental rules on searches
and seizures without warrant are not based upon arrest.
In other words, the police need not arrest in order to
proceed to a search. Nor is an arrest necessary for
"custodial interrogations".
These differences in approach may be attributable
to cultural differences including a greater mobility of
American society, which permits individuals to move
freely between jurisdictions without being easily dis-
coverable through the police's use of such devices as
identity cards.
26 Art. 181 CCP.
27 As the reader will notice, the law resembles that of
American jurisdictions. It must, however, not be
forgotten, that the theory advanced here is that Ameri-
can police have substantial reasons to interrogate the
suspect before they bring him before the magistrate;
or that stage is the only time when they can attempt
to obtain incriminating statements. See text preceding
note 19 supra.
The law in federal jurisdictions is stated in Mallory
v. U.S., 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). "All the states with two possible
exceptions [Michigan and New York] have consistently
refused to accept the McNabb case principle." INmAu
AND SOWLE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIUmNAL
JtsncE 833 (2d Ed. 1964). But see 18 U.S.C. §3501(c) which provides that
In any criminal prosecution by the United States or
by the District of Columbia, a confession made or
given by a person who is a defendant therein, while
such person was under arrest or other detention
in the custody of any law-enforcement officer law-
enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible
solely because of delay in bringing such person
before a magistrate or other officer empowered to
commit persons charged with offenses against the
laws of the United States or of the District of
Columbia if such confession is found by the trialjudge to have been made voluntarily and if the
weight to be given the confession is left to thejury and if such confession was made or given by
such person within six hours immediately follow-
ing his arrest or other detention: _Provided, That
the time limitation contained in this subsection
shall not apply in any case in which the delay in
bringing such person before such magistrate or
[Vol. 61
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delay is technically a criminal offense of false
imprisonment.P Thus, while, on summons, interro-
gation may legally proceed (on the safe assumption
that the suspect is willing to talk), it can be law-
fully conducted following arrest only insofar as it
does not interfere with prompt production of the
suspect before the investigating judge. An argu-
ment also has been made in a Yugoslav commen-
tary to the Code that where there is a lawful
arrest, there is no need for interviews. 29
Before we leave problems connected with
interrogations of suspects by the police, it is im-
portant to know whether there are any effective
guarantees that the prescribed legislative proce-
dures will be observed in practice be the police.
Mandates of a distant legislator may not be an
influential force in police behavior amidst the
pressures of their daily work in combating crime.
Most natural to an American lawyer would be
procedural sanction via exclusionary rules of
evidence. However, as previously indicated, infor-
mation gathered by the police through interviews
is incompetent evidence anyway and leaves
nothing to exclude. True, an analogue of the
"fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine," developed
in the American search and seizure cases," could
stretch the exclusionary rule so as to affect police
interviews: e.g., all later statements made by the
defendant to the investigating judge (even if all
Code rules were complied with then) would be
inadmissible, whenever a causal link would be
found between the statements to the judge and
defective police interviews.2 This would, of course,
other officer beyond such six-hour period is found
by the trial judge to be reasonable considering
the means of transportation and the distance to be
traveled to the nearest available such magistrate
or other officer.
Is Art. 150 CCP.
2The argument proceeds roughly as follows: Arrest
can be legally effected only if-among other grounds-
there is the Yugoslav equivalent of "probable cause."
At the same time, all that is required from the initial
police activity is to provide some background informa-
tion on whether there is such "probable cause." If
there is, the investigative branch of the judiciary will
institute an investigation. Thus, before arresting a
suspect the police must already possess reasonable
grounds to belleve that "probable cause"' exists. Conse-
quently there is nothing to interview the arrestee
about. See BAYER, ZAxONiK 29. There is surely logic
in this somewhat charitable interpretation of a number
of Code provisions. It is too early to make predictions
with regard to the "living law" on the matter.
0 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1919).
"61 J. CRs. L., C. & P.S-(1970).
frequently result in full immunity for the criminal
from prosecution and would probably be without
precedent in Continental practice."
Judicial Interrogation
Other than the described police interviews,
interrogation of suspects or defendants does not
occur in the United States, unless the defendant
consents to examination at a preliminary hearing
or at the trial. In Yugoslavia there are additional
interrogations. They are carried out by the inves-
tigative branch of the judiciary,"3 and can take
place either prior to or following the decision to
institute the judicial interrogation, which is
technically the initial stage of criminal proceeding.
In order to explain this procedural mechanism
a digression is necessary. In a typical case the
police will receive information that a crime has
been committed either from citizens or officers on
patrol. If these initial signals are sustained by police
investigations, the police will file an official report
(prijava, d6nonciation, Anzeige, notitio criminis)
with the public prosecutor's office,U containing a
summary of their investigative activities. A nunm-
"As will be shown later, note 68 infra, there is in
Continental practice and writing comparatively little
precedent for the exclusion of illegally obtained evi-
dence, if otherwise relevant and reliable. This applies
with special force to evidence in itself properly ob-
tained, but "tainted" by derivation from illegally
obtained clues and other information. True, in a very
limited number of countries, like France and Belgium,
products of illegal police activity must by legislative
fiat be declared null and void, and cannot be used in
the case in which they were obtained even by derivation.
E.g., 2 Sr=rAmn/LEvAssEuR, supra note 12, at 414;
LE CEXvALER Bas, PRficIs DE PROCDUPYa IN
312 (3d ed. 1951). However, in these two countries the
police are entitled to collect evidence which will later
be presented at trial. The Yugoslav police have no
such authority. Moreover, French courts sometimes
declare an illegal confession null and void, and yet do
not deprive it of evidentiary value Cf. Bouat, supra
note 24, at 173.
"Yugoslav investigating judges, who sit on the
bench of both lower and higher trial courts, are of the
"juge d'instruction" type. They have no counterpart
in this country. As indicated, supra note 5, other
socialist countries follow the Russian pattern and do not
use investigating judges. The pre-trial investigation is
conducted by investigators who are employees of the
public prosecutor's office.
I In order to avoid misunderstandings, "report of
crime" has not been labeled, as is usually done,
"complaint". Continental reports are, not sworn and
can, moreover, be anonymous when sent by private
persons. Their role in subsequent proceedings differs
from that of a complaint. The text considers only the
most usual path of the criminal process. If the report
of crime, say by a private citizen, reaches the public
prosecutor's office first, the proceedings differ. Compare
note 8 supra.
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ber of documents will be included, but notes taken
during police interviews will not be among them.
If, upon looking into the matter, the public prose-
cutor decides that a criminal case should be initi-
ated, he will request judicial interrogation. The
prosecutor is under a duty not to interrogate the
potential defendant, "unless there is a danger in
delay." 35 This affords the suspect a chance to
deny charges contained in the public prosecutor's
request, and oppose the contemplated technical in-
stitution of criminal proceedings against him.
Thus, the investigating judge often interrogates a
suspect prior to the commencement of proceed-
ings.36 Of course, just as in other Continental pro-
cedural systems, the judge will regularly interro-
gate the defendant later, in the course of the
judicial investigation.
What concerns us here are rules which regulate
all these interrogations. With one exception,7 rules
governing interrogations are the same, irrespec-
tive of whether they take place before or after the
institution of proceedings. These rules are, more-
over, mutis inutandis applicable to the defend-
ant's interrogation at trial.n An analysis of this
31 Art. 148, para. 2 CCP.
36 An additional opportunity for the investigating
judge to interrogate the defendant prior to the insti-
tution of proceedings in a technical sense arises in the
case of the so-called "anticipatory proof-taking,"
previously described in the text; p. supra.
This exception is contained in a somewhat cryptic
provision of Art. 148(3) CCP, providing for additional
interrogation of the potential defendant by the investi-
gating judge, when the latter is faced with the problem
of deciding whether or not to institute the judicial
investigation. Discussion of this point would, however,
carry us too far into the technical detail of Yugoslav
procedural law. For an in-depth discussion of the
question, see BAYER, ZAXONIK 163-66. Even in this
exceptional situation the judge is under a duty to put
the potential defendant on notice of his right to remain
silent. Art. 148(4) CCP.
8Neither on trial nor at any other stage can the
defendant be interrogated under oath. Thus if he pro-
vides false answers he cannot be prosecuted for per-jury or any similar offense. This is generally the Con-
tinental view. As previously indicated, the Continental
agencies of criminal procedure are not so much seeking
confessions as clues or general impressions that can be
derived from the defendant's statements. See accom-
panying text and note 19 supra.
In this situation many Continental legal writers,
especially in Latin countries, declare that the defend-
ant has a "right to lie." See Nuvolone, Beweisverbote
im Strafverfahren der Lander des romanischen Reclt-
skreises, in VERHANDLuNGEN DES 46 DEUTSCHEN
JURISTENTAGEs 70 (1966) [hereinafter cited as VER-
HAwDLuNGEN] For a somewhat different view in West
Germany, see 2 ScnmmT, LEnRXommENTAR ZuR STRAF-
PROZESSORDNUNG, comm. to §136, no. 11, 13, 15 (25th
ed.). For Switzerland, see PFENWINGER, PROBLEIE DES
SCUW aiENISCHEN SrasPaOZESSxcnrs 105 (1966).
will highlight some of the most important changes
introduced into the Yugoslav procedural system
by the 1967 amendments.
Under the old Code the defendant was to be
informed at the beginning of his first judicial
interrogation of the charges pressed against him
by the prosecutor, as well as of the most Salient
incriminating evidence. 9 He was not bound to
answer questions asked of him by the judge.40
Like many Continental procedural systems east
and west, the old Code did not provide whether or
not the defendant had to be informed of his right
to remain silent. As can be imagined, this informa-
tion was only occasionally given in actual practice.
Many defendants were thus under the mistaken
impression that they had to cooperate with the
examiner and answer questions addressed to them.
The socio-psychological atmosphere of interroga-
tion by an authoritative official, especially in cases
in which the defendant is brought before the
examiner by force or from jail almost inevitably
breeds such an impression. 4 Those with practical
experience in the field will also realize that the
omission of warnings makes the job much easier
for those examiners who effectively use psycho-
logical pressure to obtain an answer from the
defendant. The new Code has instituted a signifi-
cant change in this area. It explicitly provides that
at the first examination, before any questions
dealing with the matter sub judice are addressed to
the defendant, he must be informed that he is not
In Yugoslavia views on the matter vary. See DAnAg",
IsKAz OCRIVLJENOG xAO DOKAZ U SUVRmrENOM
KaRsibom PosrTuPsu (TnE DE NDoAT's STATE-
MENTS AS EVIDENTIARY SOURCE IN CONTEMPORARY
CRiaMrNA PRocEDURE) 76 (1962).
31 In the United States courts arraignment consists
of "reading the indictment or information to the de-
fendant or stating to him the substance of the charge
and calling on him to plead thereto. He shall be given a
copy of the indictment or information before he is called
upon to plead." FED. R. Cmi. P. 10.
10 Art. 212, para. 2, former CCP.41 In-custody interrogations take place in privacy.
Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a
gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the
interrogation rooms. Miranda v. Ar zona, 384 U.S.
436, 448 (1966). Although interrogation tactics are
allegedly designed to put the suspect in such psycho-
logical state that he will reveal what the police already
know, an interrogation atmosphere is created for no
reason other than to subject the accused to the intimi-
dation of the examined. Compare INBAU AND REm,
CREMNAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 43-55(1967) with Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79
HARv. L. R-tv. 21 (1965). For an examination of the
potential hazards of in-custody interrogation see
Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A
Skeptical View, 52 J. C=n. L., C. & P.S. 21 (1961).
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under any duty to "advance his defense" or
answer questions. 2 As will be seen later, there are
strict sanctions provided for failure to give this
warningl
It is submitted that in practice this change alone
probably will not substantially decrease the volume
of answers that the defendants will furnish. It is a
general Continental experience that most defend-
ants, whether or not put on notice of their right to
silence, do talk. Innocents cry out in protest against
charges, and the guilty defendants will usually do
anything to act as if they were innocent.
Innovations with a far greater potential to
affect traditional interrogation practices can be
found among the amended provisions dealing with
powers of defense counsel in relation to the interro-
gation of his client. Under the new Code, prior to
his first interrogation by the investigating judge,
the defendant must additionally be informed of his
right to assistance of counsel and of the latter's
right to be present during the interrogation."
Interrogations may lawfully proceed in the attor-
ney's absence only if the defendant explicitly
waives his right to counsel, or-if the first interro-
gation is involved-if defendant fails to secure a
42Art. 203, para. 2, CCP.
4 Art. 203(3) CCP directs the examiner, faced with
the defendant's refusal to answer, to instruct him
"if necessary" that his silence may render collection
of exculpating evidence more difficult. In our view
this warning can meaningfully be given only if the
investigator already knows whether the defendant is
guilty or innocent. Consequently it is meaningless.
Cf. BAYER, ZAxoNsx 204.
As in the other Continental systems, in the Yugo-
slav procedure the law requires that the judge first
invite the defendant to give his side of the story in a
form of a narrative account before any real interroga-
tion begins. This is in contradistinction to American
practice, at least at the trial state (if the defendant
chooses to take the stand). The Continental require-
ment of an initial narrative account, quite sound
from the view of forensic psychology, is used by many
Continental theorists in the often repeated argument
that the interrogation is designed for the sole purpose
of providing the defendant with a means of defense.
See note 51 infra. Actual practice does not substantiate
this legal argument. Many a defendant is not able to
give any meaningful narrative account without the
interposition of questioning. But, even if he is able
to do so and advance his side of the story uninterrupted,
his narrative account can as easily be used against
him as in his favor. The narrative account may, for
example, tie a guilty defendant to a particular fabrica-
tion which can, in the light of other evidence, easily be
exposed. Contradictions in the defendant's story can
later be used by the fact-finders to arrive at a con-
viction of guilt. It is for this reason that in the text
we do not refer to narrative accounts and speak simply
of interrogations. Deeper comparative analysis must
not, however, overlook this peculiar technique.
"4 Art. 66 CCP.
lawyer within 24 hours from the issuance of the
warnings. The interrogation also may begin in the
absence of counsel if the duly notified lawyer fails
to appear at the time set for the interrogation.45
The mere presence of counsel during interroga-
tions is, of course, of great psychological help to the
defendant. However, the degree to which the
traditional style of interrogations by the investi-
gating judge will be changed depends on what
powers the defense counsel has during the interro-
gation, as well as on the degree of counsel's famili-
arity with the case. In an attempt to inject as much
adversary party presentation as possible into the
Continental non-adversary pre-trial setting, the
amended Code permits defense counsel (as well as
the prosecutor who may also be present during
interrogations) to suggest specific questions to be
addressed by the judge to the defendant, or, upon
leave of court, to put questions to the defendant
directly. Also significant are defense counsel's
powers to have his comments and suggestions
entered into the official records of the interroga-
tion.
Importantly, in a provision rather rare on the
Continent, 4 defense counsel has at all times an
unlimited right to inspect the dossier of the case
Since files on the Continent record each step taken
by the judge, an unlimited discovery results
through such inspection. Even more unusual is
another related provision of the amended Code,
authorizing defense counsel to attend (along with
the prosecutor and his client) all interrogations of
witnesses and all taking of views.48
If one leaves the domain of "black-letter law"
and explores the actual position of the defendant
during the pre-trial interrogations, one encounters
a number of rather delicate and thus seldom
discussed questions. The most important is whether
45 Art. 203, para. 9, CCP.
41 Usually the inspection of the "dossier" by defense
counsel becomes unlimited only after the investigator
has reached the conclusion that he has clarified the
matter. It is interesting to note that on this score many
Continental systems are not far from the central Euro-
pean variant of the old inquisitorial procedure.
See, e.g., the discussion of the 17th century German
legal authority CARPZov, PRAcTiCA NovA RERJm
CpflSINALIUm IYMPERIA.s SAXONICA, Pars I, question
115, no. 100 et seq. (Leipzig 1635).4 7 Art. 72 CCP. See Norton, Discovery in the Crimi-
nal Process, 61 J. CiMu. L., C. & P.S. 11 (1970).
48Even the French Code of Criminal Procedure,
which resembles the Yugoslav on inspection of the
"dossier" by defense counsel, does not provide for the
interrogation of witnesses in the presence of the de-




it is possible for the investigating judge, early in
the course of the investigation, to interrogate the
defendant while the latter is not fully informed of
the precise nature of the incriminating evidence
the investigator has already gathered. This prob-
lem arises only in the early phase of the investiga-
tion, since under all Continental systems-even
those most restrictive of the rights of defense-
there comes a point in the investigation when the
investigating judge has to permit complete dis-
covery of evidence. Even in this early phase the
defendant can be only partially unaware of the
character of incriminating evidence, because the
judge must apprize the defendant at the beginning
of the interrogation of the charge and at least some
supporting evidenceA9
Why should this problem be of interest in assess-
ing the actual position of the defendant during pre-
trial interrogations? Experienced investigators
know that this situation may be used to great ad-
vantage in eliciting precious information from a
guilty defendant. If the latter is not thoroughly
familiar with all the gathered incriminating evi-
dence, he finds himself in a nervous state of mind,
trying to guess how much of his activity is actually
known to the examiner. This in turn makes the
creation of a plausible but false story very difficult.
As a result, at least some guilty defendants eventu-
ally confess, even in the absence of a decisive case
against them. This technique of interrogation, let
us call it the "playing one's cards close to the vest"
examination, may be a useful tool to get at the
truth, and convict the guilty. But, as in so many
other procedural problems, a "zero-sum" game is
involved; what is gained on one side is lost on the
other. The innocent defendant will also be affected;
he will be in a state of anxiety too, and his proper
defense at least temporarily rendered more difficult.
Moreover the possibility for self-incrimination is
increased. How society balances these conflicting
interests in arriving at a solution to this problem is,
of course, a matter of society's values. 0 But as
long as this technique of interrogation is possible,
it is somewhat hypocritical to claim--other than
on a wholly idealistic level-that the only purpose
49 See note 39 supra.
0 To the best of our knowledge this problem is
seldom thoroughly analyzed in Continental writing.
See, however, for a frank and probing discussion,
BAYER, LA SIGNIFICATION DE L'AvEu DE L'I'cun
DANS LE DROrT DR PROCPDURE PtNALE DE CERTAINS
]TATS OccmENTAux EUROPAENs, RivIsTA ITALIANA
Di DnuvrO E PROCEDURA PENALE, fasc. III, 724
(1959).
of the defendant's interrogation is to provide him
with a means of defense.51 Interrogation is in this
context also used to provide the investigator of
crime with a tool to facilitate self-incrimination,
i.e., approach the defendant as a source of informa-
tion.
Before we analyze the new Yugoslav law in terms
of discovery, let us review ways in which "close to
the vest" interrogations can be made impossible in
European investigations. Provisions to the effect
that the examiner should not use tricks, that he
must "address his questions dearly," or "ask
questions only to clarify what the defendant
spontaneously volunteered" will not suffice in
practice. More radical steps are necessary. A
fundamental change in the traditional confidential
character of the pre-trial investigation would be
to grant to the prosecution and the defense un-
qualified free access to all proof-taking steps
(interrogation of witness, views, etc.). Another
" That the sole purpose of the interrogation is to
provide the defendant with a means of defense is the
oft repeated view expressed in Continental writing,
sometimes even incorporated as a legislative aspiration
in code provisions. Compare, e.g., Clerc in VERuANDLuN-
GEN 71. This proposition is based on the legal analysis
of provisions such as those guaranteeing the defendant
a right to remain silent, the right to present'a narrative
account, supra note 43, etc. Sometimes semantics are
enlisted in support. Interrogations are called "hearings,"
thus implying passive listening on the part of the
investigator. The "hearing" of the defendant at trial is
said to precede the "proof-taking" phase, as if "hear-
ing" did not yield any evidence. In this matter there
appears to be a great discrepancy between "black-
letter law" and doctrinal proclamations on the one
hand and actual practice on the other. Comparative -
analysis must not lose sight of this difference. It is
submitted that Continental interrogations are Janus-
faced, rather than one-sided phenomena; inferences
drawn from the defendant's answers are either favorable
or detrimental to him. This applies to pre-trial inter-
rogations as much as to those at the trial. The only
Continental system known to this author whose legal
design of interrogations at trial coincided with the idea
that the defendant's interrogation is solely a means of
defense was-mirabie dictuh-that' of the Russian
Tzarist Procedural Code. Under this system there
was to be no interrogation of the defendant at trial-
at least before incriminating evidence adduced at
trial raised the need for some kind of defense-if the
defendant declared at the very outset of the trial that
he felt not guilty. See the forceful exposition of 2
FonTsKxY, Ku-s UGOLOVNAGO SUDOPROIZVOnSrVA
361 (2d ed. 1899). On the legislative history of this
arrangement see SHEHEGLOVITOV, USTAV UGOLOVNAGO
SUDOPROIZVODSTVA PO PRODOLZHENIIU 1902, 528 (8th
ed. 1913). This legislative disinterment is by no means
advanced as indicative of what the actual Russian
court practice was. Whether this arrangement resulted
in actually understating the importance of defendant's
statements as a source of evidence at trial, the author
has no way of knowing.
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tack would be to accord to the defendant at all
times an unlimited right to inspect the complete
dossier of the case. As a comparative matter, Con-
tinental countries either do not go so far, for fear
that effective law enforcement might be endan-
gered, or having gone so far, shift the bulk of actual
investigative activity to the preceding "informal"
investigative activities of the police, so much so
that the latter overshadow in importance the
judicial investigation.5 2 Finally, "close to the vest"
interrogation can be rendered very difficult in a
somewhat indirect way, by allowing defense coun-
sel to freely familiarize himself with all the evi-
dence, by studying the dossier or otherwise, and
letting him at all times communicate with his
client prior to interrogation.- A comparative tour
d'horison reveals that Continental systems impose
limitations either on inspection or on communica-
tion,5 " but that the new Yugoslav Code to some
degree allows defense counsel to be present at
proof taking and to inspect the prosecutions
dossier.
Paragraph one, article 156 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure provides that the defendant and his
counsel, as well as the prosecutor, all may attend
the interrogation of witness. At first blush it seems
like a coup de grace to traditional Continental in-
vestigation. This is all the more astonishing since
in Yugoslavia, information gathered at the police
level is incompetent evidence and the shift of
emphasis on the police level does not help law
enforcement very much. On reading the debates
accompanying the introduction of the amendments
to the Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure, one
can conclude that the drafters' intention was to
downplay the importance of techniques which use
defendant as a source of information. Close exami-
nation of the Code provisions reveals, however,
that the extent to which article 156 will actually
affect practice depends on the interpretation by
investigating judges of some related provisions of
the Code. Whether or not a party, prosecutor or
defense counsel will attend proof-taking by the
investigating judge is contingent on whether the
party is put on notice of the time and place of
proof-taking. Here the Code provides that the
investigating judge is authorized to withhold
E This was the problem with the French "enqeuet
offlcieuse". See note 12, supra.
13 As a representative provision on limitation of
inspection, see §147 (2) of the WEST GE.mN CODE or
CRm=A PRocExDux. For limitations on communi-
cation, see, as representative, art. 73, former Yugoslav
CCP.
notification in case there is "danger in delay." 1
Like the term "unreasonable delay" in American
arrest law, this phrase is not self-explanatory and
possesses equally elastic qualities. A reasonable
argument can be made that most investigatory
steps (especially if the defendant happens to be
detained) are urgent and should not be delayed.
Or as Blackstone asked, "is justice not the sweetest
when the freshest?" If this view is adopted in
Yugoslav practice, then article 156, paragraph 1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure will lose most of
its potentially momentous practical significance.
It is interesting to note in this connection that a
Yugoslav commentary to article 156 quarrels with
this interpretation, labeling it as "frivolous" and
even "dishonest." In the opinion of its author,
there is danger of delay only if notice to parties
renders the proof-taking impossible or seriously
impairs its quality. 5 Although which interpreta-
tion will be accepted is still unknown, even if the
conservative construction prevails, notifications
by virtue of article 156 (5) will still have to issue
in a significant number of instances. This alone
will place the Yugoslav pre-trial judicial investi-
gation among those least restrictive of defense
interests in contemporary non-adversary proce-
dures.
What about the defendant's right to inspect at
all times the complete dossier of the criminal case?
While defense counsel is granted this right under
the amended Code, the law is silent as to whether
the defendant has the same privilege. A leading
Yugoslav doctrinal authority takes the view that
the same rights should be extended to the defend-
ant that his counsel possesses, if only to prevent the
inequality that would arise between those defend-
ants who have and those who do not have the
assistance of counsel.56 If a contrary view is
adopted in practice, and if the provision on delay
"Art. 156, para. 5, CCP.
55 BAsx, ZAxoio at 49.
,6 Id. at 58. In a similar situation in West German
law, a contrary view has been taken. See Schmidt,
spra note 38, comment to §147, no. 3. Accord, the
judgment of the former German Supreme Court in
72 RGST 268, 275. Contra, SCawARTZ-KLmnEcnT
STRAPPROZESSORDNUNG, commentary to §147, no. 2
(25th ed. 1965). In this connection it is interesting to
note that in the discussion of the contemplated amend-
ments to the Yugoslav CCP, objections were raised
that the extension of defense counsel's powers may
result in increased inequality between defendants of
various financial means. See MARxovIc, KoxE, Is-
TRAGA: POuCIJI Mx SUrn (To Whom SnouLD IN-
VEsTIGATiON BE ENTRUsTED: THE POLICE OR THE
CouRT), Izbor no. 4, p. 5 (1967).
1970]
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as justification for omitting to notify counsel about
proof taking is conservatively interpreted, then
"close to the vest" interrogations will remain
possible in actual practice. But the possibility of
such examinations will be limited to the earliest
stages of the investigation in view of the fact that
the restrictions on the defendant's right to com-
municate with counsel (and hence get access to
the information in the dossier) are permissible
only prior to the first interrogation.57 No matter
how the resulting procedural situation would
deviate from that contemplated by Miranda v.
Arizona,2 and a number of United States Supreme
Court decisions preceding it," the comparatist will
realize that, even in the event of a conservative
interpretation, the amended Code among Conti-
nental systems least restricts defense interests.
The next issue which concerns us is the extent
to which evidence acquired by the interrogation of
the defendant during the judicial investigation
may be instrumental in reaching a decision on the
question of guilt at the trial stage. As is typical of
Continental procedural systems, the Yugoslav in-
vestigating judge will draw up in digest form a
record of each interrogation. In doing so he will
have to act in compliance with a great number of
provisions designed to assure the reliability of
information contained in the protocol. 6 The
records of interrogations, included in the dossier,
may then be introduced as evidence at trial, sub-
ject to the standard Continental limitations
emanating from the procedural principle of "direct-
ness." 61 Even when records are not introduced into
evidence, their content will as a practical matter
still affect the ultimate decision. This occurs in a
round-about way. As is usual on the Continent,
the Yugoslav judge will always study the dossier
of the case in preparation for the trial. Later, as a
towering figure, flanked by lay assessors, he will
have to decide both the questions of law and fact.6 2
5" Art. 73, para. 1, CCP.
'384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11 Arts. 77-82 CCP.
61 The principle of directness requires, among other
things, that witnesses and defendants heard in the
preliminary investigation be questioned again at trial.
However, if statements at trial differ from those given
earlier, prior interrogations may be read in court.
Damaka, Fundamental Principles of Non-Adversary
Procedure, in CoaR Tv CRnnr. LAW AND
PROcEDuRE 61--63 (1968) (unpublished mimeo, copies
available in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School, Philadelphia, Pa.).2 This happens even in some of those Continental
countries which retained the "jury" in prosecutions
for certain classes of criminal offenses (e.g., France.)
Consequently, the pre-trial records will, in a
normal case, influence the decision rendered by the
court, irrespective of whether this is reflected in
the trial court's opinion.
In view of the use made of pre-trial records, the
question of sanctions for violations of rules regu-
lating interrogations by the investigating judge
assumes great practical importance. The exclusion
from evidence of statements obtained during
defective interrogations suggests itself as a possible
sanction. The old Code contained no such pro-
visions. In this situation some argued that state-
ments, if reliable and relevant, should be admis-
sible at trial notwithstanding procedural irregulari-
ties in their procurement. 3 It would seem that this
view was followed in court practice. Without
exception appellate decisions reversing judgments
based on illegally obtained confessions dealt with
statements whose trustworthiness was doubtful.
Inadmissibility, therefore, was predicated on the
truth test, rather than on an objective exclusionary
rule.
In contradistinction to the old Code the amended
Code has effective sanctions for violations of the
rules regulating interrogation. If the judge fails to
issue the required warnings of the right to counsel
and the right to remain silent, or if he fails to enter
into the record the fact that he issued these warn-
ings, the court is not permitted in arriving at its
decision on the merits to use as evidence statements
obtained from the defendant during such defective
interrogations." It is irrelevant whether or not the
statements are otherwise completely voluntary
and trustworthy. The same consequence attaches
if the defendant was interrogated in the absence
of counsel, save under circumstances in which this
is in conformity with the Code. Also of great
practical importance is another new provision,
article 81, inserted among those dealing with
documents and records. It provides that whenever
the Code stipulates that the criminal judgment
cannot be "based on specific statements," the
investigating judge is bound to extract from the
official dossier of the case any records containing
these "tainted" statements. After being removed
from the files, the records have to be placed in a
separate folder and must not be inspected or
6 This was the view of the present author. See
Dama&ka, Procesne posijedice scpotrebe dokaza pri-
bavljenih na nedozvzojeni nagin (Procedural Consequences
of Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence) in NAAA ZA-
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utilized in any manner in the subsequent proceed-
ings. If the judge fails to act pursuant to this pro-
vision, and fails to extract the records either on the
motion of defense counsel or as part of his official
duties, defense counsel will at a later stage have
additional opportunity to request their exclusion
before the case comes up for trial.ss Since under the
Yugoslav system, the trial court rules on both the
admissibility and the weight of evidence, this pro-
cedural device greatly reduces the likelihood that
tainted evidence will affect the fact-finders' minds.
The amended Code does not decide the issue of
the admissibility of derivative evidence, i.e., evi-
dence obtained from clues and leads contained in
illegally procured statements. This is of great prac-
tical significance since the investigating judge,
just as the police, will question the defendant more
than anything else to elicit information on the
basis of which physical and other evidence to be
presented in court can be discovered. As previously
indicated, the Code of Criminal Procedure explic-
itly refers only to the exclusion of the defendants
"statements." 11 Yugoslav courts are thus at
liberty to decide the question of whether to con-
strue the Code restrictively, or adopt some kind
of a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Per-
suasive legal arguments can be advanced in support
of both interpretations. But these arguments will
not detain us here because they would carry us too
far afield into technical detail and because, more
importantly, it is quite unlikely that the per-
suasiveness of mere legal arguments, one way or
another, will be the controlling consideration in
shaping practice under the new Code. What will be
decisive is the extent to which the complete im-
munity which may result from rigorous exclusion
seems acceptable to the court. Isolated voices not-
withstanding,u there seems to be little evidence
65 This happens in the framework of the proceedings
for "contesting the charging papers." Art. 246 CCP.
Somewhat similar provisions pertaining to the extrac-
tion of documents from the dossier can be found in
French law. Art. 173, FRmtcH CODE OF CiunNAL
PROCEDURE.
6 Art. 203 (10) CCP.
6?These isolated voices are mostly heard in aca-
demic circles, where the emphasis on consistency and
symmetry is not tempered by considerations of a
utilitarian nature and actual responsibility for decisions.
An example of a highly respected academic voice in
favor of the ban on derivative evidence comes from
West Germany. With respect to a provision of the
German Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 136a,
resembling the Yugoslav Art. 203(10) CCP. K. Peters
argues that no evidence derived from ilegally obtained
statements of the defendant should be "evaluated"
(used in arriving at a decision) as long as the "causation
chain" with the unlawful evidence is unbroken. See
that such a liberal position prevails in the Yugoslav
or any other Continental court practice." In con-
trast to American practice where, even in cases of
serious violent crimes, the strict implementation of
Peters, Beweiverbote im deutscken Strafverfahren, in
VEELAi;DLNGEN 160. Symmetry would, of course,
require exclusion of illegally obtained evidence even
if it favors the defendant. For a more cautious view
see Walder Rechlswidrig erlangte Beweisittel im Straf-
prozess, 82 Scrw mz~msscn ZETscmmzr rU STRA-
racnT 47 (1966).
Besides such isolated scholarly analyses advocating
the rejection of derivative evidence, one can occasion-
ally find in Continental writing broad proclamations
to the effect that evidence extracted from the defendant
cannot be used, in any form, as a basis for his con-
viction. It would seem, however, that those who make
these broad pronouncements do not always distinguish
between trustworthy and untrustworthy illegal evi-
dence or express opinions on suspected trends. For a
realistic appraisal of one such broad pronouncement see
Nuvolone, Beweisverbote den Liandern des romainischen
Rechiskreises, in VES o=LuNGEx 89.
68 From an American perspective there seems to be
in all European countries relatively little discussion
of the problem whether reliable evidence, illegally
obtained from the defendant, may be used in arriving
at a decision of guilt. The tenor of the Continental
tradition is, of course, in favor of admissibility, al-
though one can find even in the days of the old in-
quisitorial procedure writers who would exclude illegal
evidence even at the price of acquitting the guilty.
See, e.g. JuLiEN DENrAND, EssAi DE JuisPRuDEc
CDRtiNELLE, Tome II, 165-66 (Lausanne 1785), who
points to the example of English trials. [The book is
available in the rare book section of the Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
Philadelphia, Pa.] The only exception to the traditional
practice of admitting illegal evidence (if truthful) seems
to have been sporadic exclusion of incriminating evi-
dence addressed to the defendant's father confessor.
see I PrrAvAX, CAusEs CMrBRas AN LCtREss qrEs
AVEC IMS JUGEMENTS Qui LEs ONT DECmtE 377-79,
405 (Richer ed. 1772).
Decisional authority is also rather scarce in Europe.
Occasional court decisions usually do not warrant
reliable conclusions and their importance on the Con-
tinent should not be equated with that of American
decisions. Few legislative enactments follow the West
German and Yugoslav example and explicitly deal
with the issue, even if limited to unlawfully obtained
statements only.
The fact that there is very little authority on the
exclusionary rule in the context of defective interroga-
tions is in itself significant, if our expectations are not
unfounded that defective interrogation must occur in
practice. Lack of litigation of the issue seems indicative
of the inhospitable attitude towards exclusion.
Scandinavian law seems to favor admissibility of
unlawfully obtained evidence, on the condition, of
course, that it is reliable. Compare ANDENA.S, STRAFrr-.
PRoSESSEN 336 (1962); see also VEIuANDLUNGEN 25-26.
Italian decisional authority and much scholarly writing
seem to take the same view. For a somewhat different
view in Italian writing, see COREIRO, PROVE ILLECITE
NEL PROCESSO PENALE, RIvisTA ITAfiANA DiR. E PROc.
PEN. 32 (1961). Swiss practice does not permit any
conclusions. See Walder, supra note 67, at 37. The
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the exclusionary rules results in definitive acquit-
tals of notoriously guilty perpetrators, 69 case his-
tories of people like Escobedo or Mallory have yet
to arise in Yugoslavia. What is involved in this con-
present author was not able to find any, authority on
the issue under consideration in any socialist country
except Yugoslavia, note 63 supra. Even in jurisdictions
such as Scotland or France in which the exclusionary
principle seems to be adopted, a case by case approach
often leads to the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence. For France compare Bouzat, supra note 24 at 173;
for Scotland see Lawrie v. Muir, 1950 Justiciary Cases
19. In West Germany, as in Yugoslavia, the practical
significance of the exclusionary rule depends on whether
it stretches to derivative evidence. The only case in
point found by the author rejects the extension. See
the judgment of OLG Oldenburg, reported in Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 683 (1955). Some influential
commentaries follow suit. See ScnwARTz-KLEnnraNucHT,
supra note 56, commentary to §136a; ScHnmT, supra
note 38, commentary to §136a. In any of these countries,
there are probably no cases of notorious perpetrators
of violent crime going free as a result of the operation
of the exclusionary rule.
Perhaps a caveat is needed at the close of these
remarks on the exclusionary rule in the area of defective
interrogation of defendants. The reader must not be
mislead into thinking that the scarcity of rules exclud-
ing reliable but legally defective evidence prevails in
all areas of Continental criminal procedure. It is true
in the law of searches and seizures, but not in the law
dealing with privileges of witnesses. Except for sporadic
examples to the contrary (e.g., France, Russia), wit-
nesses are granted the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion by explicit statutory provisions. The violation of
these privileges results as a rule in the exclusion of the
testimony obtained even if otherwise reliable. In some
European jurisdictions witnesses' privileges are much
broader than in typical American jurisdictions see, e.g.,
Art. 222 of the Yugoslav CCP.
11 But see Jessie v. State, 28 Miss. 100, 103-4 (1854):
The word 'guilty' universally, in law, implies a
trast is probably a vast cultural difference. 0 It thus
appears to us that the Yugoslav Code, following
the amendments, has gone as far in the direction
of excluding trustworthy evidence illegally ob-
tained from the defendant as the culture would
tolerate. An extension of the exclusion rule to
derivative evidence would be surprising indeed.
violation of law-a commission of an act or omis-
sion of a duty under circumstances which render
the commission or omission unlawful. When it is
said that the law is made for the protection of the
innocent by a due punishment of the guilty, and
that it is better than [sic] ninety-nine guilty persons
should escape than that one innocent should be
punished, the term 'guilty' is not asserted of persons
who do or have done acts which may or may not
be unlawful..., but all those who actually do or
have done such acts attended by such circum-
stances to render them illegal.
70 The fact that a rigorous application of the exclu-
sionary rules with reference to trustworthy evidence is
relatively more acceptable in America than in Europe
may have something to do with the greater impersonali-
zation emanating from greater size, the increased social
mobility and somewhat weaker family ties in the
United States. The release of a notorious criminal,
particularly in rape or murder cases, into a sedentary,
peasant type society seems almost unthinkable. Ameri-
can attitudes toward the exclusionary rule are reflective
of the relatively greater cultural tolerance of allowing
known criminals to be at large in order to preserve other
legal and moral values. The impossibility of appeal by
the state and the problem of organized crime with its
known leaders freely moving about are other aspects
of the essentially same cultural phenomenon so striking
to foreign observers.
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